What’s Wrong with Brazil? Evaluating the World Cup: Groups A-D

This first set of evaluations of the teams who competed at the 2014 World Cup in Brazil comprises the participants of groups A-D, listed in the order in which they finished the group stage. I explore how the teams’ tournaments progressed, and suggest the course of their futures. And in this first piece, I analyse at length the range of problems within Brazil’s squad, which implicates a crucial flaw in the country’s footballing philosophy over the last twenty years. This is a period which has, admittedly, seen Brazil lift two World Cups and reach one further final. Yet it has also witnessed a marked deterioration in Brazil’s style of play, and has resulted at this juncture in weakness on the pitch.

Brazil

Many of the analyses of Brazil’s semi-final defeat against Germany have been wildly or gravely portentous rather than reflective: they have focused on the potential ramifications of the defeat for Brazilian football, taking its apparently sorry state as a given rather than attempting to identify its precise nature and causes. Talk of ‘Maracanazo II’, the ‘Ghosts’ of Maracanazo returning, and of a fate worse than that defeat on home soil in what was effectively the final of the 1950 World Cup, seems both simplified and sensationalist. While reminiscence of the surprise 2-1 loss to Uruguay undoubtedly added to the weight of pressure which this Brazil side evidently struggled against, the Maracanazo cannot sensibly be said to have tormented the Brazilian mind and the Brazilian game for sixty-four years.

After making the quarter-final stage at the next World Cup in Switzerland, Brazil went on to win three of the next four tournaments, in Sweden in 1958, Chile in 1962, and Mexico in 1970. Against Uruguay – the bogeymen of the tale as much as the Maracana stadium or the concept of home defeat – they maintained a strong record, unfettered, for instance, as they beat their rivals 3-1 in Guadalajara in the semi-finals of Mexico 1970. Among the Brazilian people, following the 7-1 loss against Germany last Tuesday, despite the obvious disappointment in the stands, defeat seemed to be taken with dignity and grace. There was little of the tension in the streets which had been posited as an outcome of Brazil’s elimination, no violent outpouring despite the extent of anger felt and expressed in the build up to the tournament.

Looking at Brazil’s success in 1970 in Mexico, however, as much as Brazil’s attackers – Pele, Rivelino, Jairzinho, Tostao – and their goalscoring full-back, Carlos Alberto, remain emblems of the beautiful game, just as praised and equally as important to the side’s success were their two central midielders, Clodoaldo and Gerson. And looking back to their first World Cup triumph in 1958 and to Didi, and to their 1982 side – fondly remembered as one of the best ever despite falling to eventual winners Italy – and to Socrates and Zico, the great Brazilian sides of the past have been defined by their central midfield players as much as by their forwards and strikers.

Even in the attack at this moment in time, Brazil look relatively weak, with Fred a poor target man, supporting players like Hulk and Jo decidedly limited, and Alexandre Pato a spent force at just twenty-four years old. Yet with Bernard and Oscar, and most of all with Neymar, there is room for optimism regarding the future. The central defence will perhaps not be of the utmost concern given the range of players established and emerging in the position; but at full-back, with Dani Alves and Maicon towards the end of their careers, Brazil urgently require new talent. For a position which has been so important to Brazilian football – and which was so well served for a decade and a half by Roberto Carlos and Cafu – Marcelo is a capable attacker, but too often crude and reckless defensively, while Rafael, Fabio, and Danilo have stagnated at club level and are struggling for an international opportunity.

Most of all though, Brazil lack accomplished central midfielders. In fact, it is arguable that they have lacked a playmaker for the position – someone with a range of passing and the intelligence to dictate the play – since the 80s. Italia 90 all the way through until the World Cup final at France 98 was the Dunga era: a supremely effective defensive midfielder, his short passing and sitting in front of the defence came to symbolise what many thought of as a functional but dull Brazil. Brazil’s World Cup triumph at USA 94 vindicated the approach, as it was Brazil’s first World Cup win – and first final appearance – in twenty-four years. Yet that side received much criticism for its pragmatic and unadventurous approach, Dunga sitting alongside the hardworking Mauro Silva, the team heavily reliant on their two star forwards, Romario and Bebeto. By 1998, Brazil had more exciting wide players to call on in Roberto Carlos, Cafu, Leonardo, and Rivaldo; Ronaldo now starred alongside Bebeto up front; but with such talent to break forward from the wide positions, and with Ronaldo able to score goals out of nothing, even less emphasis was placed on the ball-playing capacity of the centre of midfield.

Four of these superstars remained and excelled during Brazil’s success in South Korea and Japan in 2002. Ronaldo and Rivaldo now had Ronaldinho playing behind them, and Cafu and Robert Carlos were given advanced wing-back roles. Yet the centre of midfield featured Gilberto Silva and Kleberson. In fact, Gilberto Silva was always a capable box-to-box player, a lack of pace masking workrate and good positional sense in the attack as well as the defence. For Arsenal, he chipped in with the occasional goal; but for Brazil he was asked to cover for other players, offering running and a limited passing game. Across the early 2000s until the unsuccessful World Cup campaign of 2006, he was joined by Emerson – perhaps Brazil’s most accomplished midfielder of the period, and the most successful for his clubs, but deep-lying for the international team, and often injured at key moments – and by Ze Roberto, Juninho Paulista, and Juninho Pernambucano.

Ze Roberto and Juninho Paulista offered genuine dribbling ability. Juninho Paulista, the most attacking of all these players, had started the World Cup in 2002 as part of the first eleven, but was dropped in favour of Kleberson at the quarter-final stage. Ze Roberto played alongside Emerson in 2006, but he was more of a wide player at heart, and played in a supporting role behind Kaka, Ronaldinho, Adriano, and Ronaldo. By 2010, Felipe Melo was occupying one of the midfield berths, a retrenchment that proved costly as he was sent off against the Netherlands in a quarter-final defeat.

So the cautious and overtly physical approach taken by Luiz Felipe Scolari this time round was far from new, but exacerbated by the lack of talent elsewhere on the pitch. Luiz Gustavo sat and made a nuisance of himself just in front of the Brazilian defenders; and Paulinho or Fernandinho were essentially asked to cover the expanse of ground that lay between defence and attack. It did not work. Yet while Brazil are short of players in other key positions, any return towards an ethos which would see them attempt to develop play through the centre of the pitch seems unlikely given their dearth of midfield options. Luiz Gustavo and Lucas Leiva may be more defensive, but they and Paulinho, Fernandinho, and Ramires offer much the same in their lack of flair and composure on the ball, being primarily runners, all prone to cynical challenges. Hernanes was once the bright hope for the Brazilian midfield, but he is now twenty-nine, has never established himself for Brazil, and lacks pace. There are no obvious prospects on the horizon, with Lucas Moura of Paris Saint-Germain in the mould of Brazil’s other young attacking players.

Mexico

After advancing from the group stage unbeaten and with seven points, Mexico were two minutes from progressing against the Netherlands in the round of sixteen – before succumbing to a late Wesley Sneijder strike and to Klaas-Jan Huntelaar’s disputed penalty. Their standout player, the goalkeeper Guillermo Ochoa, remains without a club; but what marked Mexico above all was their cohesion, emboldened by Miguel Herrara from the sidelines, his 5-3-2 defensively solid and quick and incisive on the attack. While their defensive mainstays – Marquez, Rodriguez, and Salcido – will have played their last World Cup, they can continue to call on their mobile attackers, Andres Guardado, Hector Herrera, and Giovani dos Santos. Javier Hernandez’s goalscoring record remains impressive, but his all-round game is proving insufficient to entice both his international and his club managers.

Croatia

Possessing two of the best central midfield players in the competition in Luka Modric and Ivan Rakitic – who will line up next year for Real Madrid and Barcelona respectively – Croatia seemed to lose heart after their controversial defeat in the tournament’s opening game against Brazil. Despite thrashing Cameroon, they succumbed meekly to Mexico to finish third in their group. The likes of Modric, Mario Mandzukic, Nikica Jelavic and Vedran Corluka should be about for one more World Cup, but this squad will perhaps peak at the next European Championship in two years’ time – when they will hope to gain from the youth of Sime Vrsaljko, Ante Rebic, Mateo Kovacic, and Alen Halilovic.

Cameroon

Coming away from the group stages with the worst goal difference of all sides in the competition, Cameroon’s World Cup was disastrous. Their preparations marked by a row over bonuses, the squad was further blighted upon departure by allegations of match fixing. Cameroon should possess a strong spine with Nicolas N’Koulou, Aurelien Chedjou, Alex Song and Joel Matip, and they have some capable forwards. But they sorely lack direction and a figurehead on the pitch, as Samuel Eto’o’s international career winds down amid infighting and acrimony.

Netherlands

With the perspective in the country that their side would struggle to advance beyond the group stage, the Netherlands’ progress to the semi-finals – and to a third-place finish after beating Brazil – must be considered a success. It is a tribute to Louis van Gaal’s ability to mould and unite a team; while on the pitch, Arjen Robben proved himself one of the world’s best players. But the Dutch – such a force at international level since finishing World Cup runners-up in 1974 – may have to be thankful for what they’ve witnessed rather than looking forward with renewed hope.

There is the sense that they are not producing players like they used to. While Ajax come foremost in the world’s perceptions about the Dutch game, and continue to be viewed as providing a sort of finishing school for rounded young footballers, they and Feyenoord are equally responsible for providing today’s new Dutch talent. The young midfielders and defenders Memphis Depay, Georginio Wijnaldum, Kevin Strootman, Jordy Clasie, Daley Blind, Bruno Martins Indi, and Stefan de Vrij are all capable. But the Dutch appear to lack an outstanding prospect in the attack, with Robben and Robin van Persie to be thirty-four by 2018. This is after two decades which have seen Patrick Kluivert, Dennis Bergkamp, Marc Overmars and Clarence Seedorf, Ruud van Nistelrooy, and Robben and Van Persie alongside Wesley Sneijder and Rafael van der Vaart, all establish themselves early on the world stage. Along with Depay, Jean-Paul Boetius, Tonny Vilhena, Marco van Ginkel, and Adam Maher are attacking-minded midfielders with some promise. Up front, the prospects are rawer still: Luc Castaignos, with Twente after an unsuccessful stint at Inter Milan; Jurgen Locadia at PSV; and the seventeen-year-old Richairo Zivkovic, who has recently moved to Ajax. The Netherlands will need some of these players to secure big moves and start prospering before the next World Cup.

Van Gaal, of course, is away to Manchester United. Guus Hiddink is his immediate replacement. However, in a move slightly bemusing for its apparent logic, Hiddink will remain the manager of the Netherlands only until the end of Euro 2016. After that tournament, Daley Blind – currently an assistant to Hiddink – will take over, provisionally until the end of the 2018 World Cup.

Chile

Edged by Brazil on penalties in the round of sixteen, Chile were – like Mexico and Colombia – one of the tournament’s most engaging teams. Perhaps the most flexible side in the tournament tactically, they were capable of adapting their formation at will. Through the energetic wing-backs Mauricio Isla and Eugenio Mena, a resolute 5-3-2 when defending readily became a lively 3-5-2 on the attack. Remarkably, of their seven most defensive players – once Isla and Mena dropped, and with Marcelo Diaz and Charles Aranguiz ahead of the back three – not one stands taller than 5 feet and 10 inches, or 1.78 metres.

Mobile throughout the midfield, the 3-5-2 even turned into a 3-4-3 as Jorge Valdivia, Arturo Vidal, or Felix Gutierrez advanced through the centre to play just behind the two forwards. Alexis Sanchez ran off Eduardo Vargas, and Chile pressed relentlessly up the pitch. Chile sometimes struggle to score the goals their football would seem to deserve, but with many of their players only in their mid-twenties, and a committed coach in Jorge Sampaoli, they will remain an enticing side to watch.

Spain

As the reigning world and consecutive European champions fell appallingly from grace – losing their first two games, against the Netherlands and Chile, 1-5 and 0-2 – manager Vicente del Bosque was heavily criticised in some quarters, with it even suggested that he had failed to add a scrap to the successful side he inherited after 2008. While a side can hardly remain at the pinnacle of the sport over such a period without astute management, still Del Bosque erred significantly this time round. The move to a more direct style, with Diego Costa up front, proved ineffective and did not play to the strengths of the rest of the squad. The strained reluctance to field Cesc Fabregas and David Villa was bizarre.

Though the demise of tiki-taka has been widely bemoaned and – more commonly – celebrated, Spain’s failure in Brazil reflects less the obsolescence of the style of play, more how other teams have adapted to combat it and how difficult it is to pull off with ageing players, who are less able to press. Spain have enough emerging talent to rebuild however they see fit. They may stick with Costa as a target man, and utilise the flanks with players including Pedro, Gerard Deulofeu, and Iker Muniain; or with Isco, Thiago, Koke, and Javi Martinez, they have a new generation capable of revitalising a possession-based approach.

Australia

The lowest-ranked team going into the tournament, at first glance Australia were typically plucky in defeat. Yet – aside from the game against the Netherlands, in which they briefly led 2-1, and which saw Tim Cahill’s magnificent left-footed volley – they were well beaten by Chile and Spain. As Tim Cahill and Mark Bresciano – both thirty-four – depart the international arena, Australia’s squad shows some promising young players, but a severe lack of experience at the top level of club football.

Colombia

Managed by Jose Pekerman, Colombia were one of the standout sides of the World Cup. Full of goals in the group stages and comfortably dispatching Uruguay in the round of sixteen, they overcame the absence of their star striker, Radamel Falcao, and in James Rodriguez had arguably the tournament’s best player, and one who drew neutrals to the side. In front of a solid back six, with two holding midfielders sitting in front of the four in defence, Cuadrado impressed while Rodriguez – playing out wide and as a support striker, but mostly as a number ten – scored goal after goal, finishing the tournament with six goals and the Golden Boot. Alas, like Chile, Colombia fell to a marginal defeat at the hands of Brazil after a scrappy physical contest.

A €45 million signing for Monaco from Porto just one year ago, the twenty-three-year-old James is now in the process of completing a move to Real Madrid for double that amount. He will presumably play as a number ten behind a forward line which could comprise Cristiano Ronaldo, Karim Benzema, and Gareth Bale. Still owning Angel di Maria, Isco, and Jese, and having signed Toni Kroos for a midfield which already contains Luka Modric, Xabi Alonso, Sami Khedira, and Asier Illarramendi, Madrid possess a moderately sized squad but with a baffling hoard of talent in midfield and attack. Angel di Maria will presumably follow Alvaro Morata out the door; but it still seems absurd the way in which a tiny handful of clubs have consolidated so many – in fact, now essentially all – of the world’s top players. This is not good for the game as a whole, and it results in inevitable wastage as great players are misused or struggle for adequate playing time.

Greece

Synonymous with negative, obstructionist football ever since their European Championship success in 2004, Greece lived up to their reputation. They ground their way through the group stage, snatching their only victory in the final seconds of their final group game against Ivory Coast; before succumbing on penalties to Costa Rica in the round of sixteen. This was the last stand for the two remaining heroes of 2004, Giorgos Karagounis and Kostas Katsouranis; but also for longstanding forward Theofanis Gekas, Greece’s third top-scorer of all time, who alas missed the decisive penalty against Costa Rica.

Ivory Coast

Moments from progressing from the group stages against Greece, Ivory Coast will see the fading of a generation of players over the next four years. Didier Drogba, Didier Zokora, and Kolo Toure all have over a hundred caps for the nation, and all are well into their thirties. With Yaya Toure looking tired, Drogba remained the talisman of this side, called upon for their decisive match despite Wilfried Bony’s two goals in the previous two games. Bony and Gervinho will continue to provide Ivory Coast with a dangerous attack; they have Seydou Doumbia and Lacina Traore, both on standby this time round, to come into the squad; while a youthful group of defenders and midfielders have begun gaining international experience.

Japan

A disappointing tournament for Japan, who may have expected more enjoyment from a talented group of players, many of whom ought to be playing at the peak of their careers. Keisuke Honda, Shinji Kagawa, Shinji Okazaki, and captain Makoto Hasebe are all good footballers, and Japan boasted a vastly experienced defence. But they managed only two goals, failing to score against Greece, and being roundly beaten by Colombia.

Costa Rica

One of the surprise packages of the tournament, Costa Rica reached the quarter-finals of the World Cup for the first time. Built around a conservative five man defence, with Celso Borges and Yeltsin Tejeda ahead of the centre-backs, and with Bryan Ruiz and Christian Bolanos running from wide to support Joel Campbell, Costa Rica proved hard to break down and sharp on the break. They deservedly beat Uruguay and Italy to progress from what appeared a difficult group, before beating Greece on penalties, and falling to the Netherlands after more of the same.

The absence of centre-back Oscar Duarte against the Netherlands – owing to a red card accrued against Greece – ought to have been a blow, yet Costa Rica’s defence remained relatively untroubled. However, after playing for an hour with ten men in the previous match, their forwards were evidently worn out. With a good mixture of youth and experience throughout the squad, Costa Rica can look towards building on their overall performance.

Uruguay

Uruguay’s is an ageing and an experienced squad: it was the third oldest and the second most-capped going into the World Cup. Persisting with experience – restricting Gaston Ramirez and Abel Hernandez, who could have added some dribbling ability and pace, to brief cameos from the bench – Uruguay were set up to be defensively solid and to rely on Luis Suarez in the attack. Without him, as they were against Costa Rica in their opening game, and against Colombia – after Suarez’s bite – in the round of sixteen, both Edinson Cavani and the Uruguay attack appeared equally flat. Suarez’s behaviour, while harder to understand and provoking a more visceral response, was ultimately no more grievous than many other things which occur and are perpetrated on the football pitch. Uruguay’s bigger concern will be the extent of the rebuilding they face when the current generation of players retire. Many of this squad – which already looks a little tired – may hang on for one last World Cup.

Italy

Cesare Prandelli, upon taking the Italy job in 2010, had to oversee a process of renewal. Fabio Cannavaro, Gianluca Zambrotta, and Gennaro Gattuso all retired after the 2010 World Cup; and the spectres of Alessandro del Piero and Francesco Totti continued to dwell, with recalls for both players never dismissed as Italy struggled for creativity in the attacking third. Though they reached the final of Euro 2012, Italy came into this World Cup lacking identity. In every match of the group stage, their formation changed. Against England, they played with something approaching a diamond 4-4-2, with Antonio Candreva playing off Mario Balotelli. Despite that side’s 2-1 success, in the next game against Costa Rica, they moved towards a purer 4-3-3, with Candreva wide on the right and Claudio Marchisio wide on the left, between the midfield and Balotelli at the head of the attack. Then in their decisive match against Uruguay, they switched to a back three, with wing-backs and Ciro Immobile playing off Balotelli.

The only constants were Andrea Barzagli as one of the centre-backs, Balotelli as the focal point of the attack, and Andrea Pirlo in the centre of midfield. Even Pirlo’s position changed subtly, as he was pushed slightly wide or forward from his usual deep-lying role, playing alongside two or three from Daniele De Rossi, Marco Verratti, Marchisio, and Thiago Motta. As much as his off-the-field antics amuse or antagonise, Balotelli is often brighter away from the pitch than he is on it: always capable of a match-winning performance, when he isn’t switched on, he offers his side nothing. Not only his goalscoring touch, but the basics of movement and the strength to hold the ball disappear.

After the surprise loss versus Costa Rica, Italy needed something against Uruguay, but fell to a contentious late defeat – having been reduced to ten men, and conceding moments after Luis Suarez’s bite on Giorgio Chiellini went unpunished. Thus Italy were eliminated at the group stage for the second World Cup in a row. Prandelli immediately tendered his resignation, and Italy are now looking for a new manager. Pirlo, at least, has said that he will remain available for selection.

England

England managed to fall short of diminished expectations, failing to win a game in Brazil despite some promising moments in the attack against Italy. They look slight in the centre of defence with no outstanding talents emerging to improve the situation; Joe Hart should feel challenged as England’s number one; Wayne Rooney’s precise function in the side remains unclear; but most pressing of all is the need to reconfigure the midfield, a weakness for over a decade. Steven Gerrard ought to be eased out of the international picture, but England lack options with only Jack Wilshere and Jordan Henderson naturals for a central midfield role.

For more on England at the World Cup, see ‘A Recapitulation of England’s Failings at the World Cup’.